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GOVERNMENTAL NONDISCLOSURE
IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
MITON M. CARROW f
Due process requires that the right of the government to withhold information
in administrative and judicial proceedings be subjected to "reasonable" limita.-
tions. This Article explores the extent of these limitations in terms of the
kinds of individual interests affected and the type of information which is
sought to be withheld. Mr. Carrow, as one who has written widely in the
field of administrative law, suggests that the present basis for determining
the limits of governmental nondisclosure, which rests upon a hierarchy of
interests, be abandoned in favor of one which, by defining the kinds of infor-
imation which are presumptively privileged, would leave the adjustment of
interrelated interests to the court.
Government agencies collect, evaluate and store vast amounts of
information pertinent to their functions and often of vital importance to
others. Efforts to gain access to desired portions of such information
by the legislature, members of the public or for use in judicial proceed-
ings are sometimes resisted by the agencies and thus raise vexing
political and legal problems. The arguments in favor of wider access to
public information by the public and by private interests have recently
been stated and documented under the banner of the "People's Right
To Know." I The Congress has also been stirred to conduct an intensive
investigation into the subject in the wake of refusals by executive
departments to make available requested information to legislative
investigating committees.
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1. CRoss, THE PEOPLeS RIGHT To KNOW (1953) ; Parks, The Open Government
Principle: Applying the Right To Know Under the Constitution, 26 Gao. WASH. L.
REv. 1 (1957). Written for the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Cross's book
describes and analyzes the areas in which the government withholds information from
the public.
2. Beginning in November 1955, the House Committee on Government Operations,
through its Government Information Subcommittee (Rep. John E. Moss, Chairman),
conducted public hearings during 1955, 1956 and 1957 on Availability Of Information
From Federal Departments and Agencies. See Second Report by the Committee on
Government Operations, H.R. Rap. No. 157, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). In its
Twenty-Fifth Intermediate Report, H.R. REP. No. 2947, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 81
(1956) (hereinafter cited as H.R. RaP. No. 2947, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956)) the
Committee stated as follows: "Slowly, almost imperceptibly, a paper curtain has
descended over the Federal Government. Behind this curtain lies an attitude novel
(166)
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Less attention has been given to the problem as it appears in its
most acute aspect, namely, when an administrative agency, in the course
of an adjudicative proceeding, conducted either before the agency or
the courts, utilizes information in its possession to the detriment of a
person, but at the same time asserts a right, or privilege, to withhold
such information from the affected person, as well as from the
adjudicative tribunal.
This situation has confronted the courts in a number of different
instances in recent years. Cases have arisen where agencies, on the
basis of undisclosed information, have discharged people from public
employment,3 caused their discharge from private employment in
companies performing work under military contracts,4 denied appli-
cations of United States citizens for passports,5 excluded a former
resident alien from readmission to the United States as well as aliens
applying for the first time,0 rejected an application for the suspension
of deportation where the record warranted favorable action,1 refused
access to an accident investigation report in a suit against the Govern-
ment under the Federal Tort Claims Act,' required registration of an
to democratic government-an attitude which says that we, the officials, not you, the
people, will determine how much you are to be told about your own government."
On May 17, 1954, President Eisenhower sent a letter to the Secretary of De-
fense in connection with testimony at the Army-McCarthy hearings before the Senate's
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, directing him to instruct the employees
of his department "that in all of their appearances before the subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Government Operations regarding the inquiry now before it,
they are not to testify to any such conversations or communications or to produce
any such documents or reproductions." N.Y. Times, May 18, 1954, p. 24, col. 1.
A memorandum from Attorney General Brownell accompanied this letter documenting
all the instances from President Washington's administration through that of Presi-
dent Truman's where the Executive had refused to divulge information in his posses-
sion to the Congress. Ibid.
On January 22, 1958, President Eisenhower wrote a letter to Senator Lyndon P.
Johnson, Chairman of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, in which he refused
to comply with a request to furnish to the subcommittee "the so-called Killian and
Gaither panel reports," which had been prepared at the President's request for the
purpose of assessing the nation's military status. After noting that "we must be
careful to maintain the proper separation of powers between the Executive and
Legislative branches of the Government," he said: "I consider it improper and unwise
for me to violate the confidence of the advisory relationship that has existed between
me and these panels or to make public the highly secret facts contained in their
reports." N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1958, p. 10, col. 3.
3. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally
divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
4. Greene v. McElroy, 254 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 27 U.S.L.
WEm 3134 (U.S. Oct. 27, 1958) (No. 180).
5. Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Dayton v. Dulles, 254 F.2d
71 (D.C. Cir. 1957). Both of these cases were reversed by the Supreme Court,
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958), without
reaching the question of the right of the Government to withhold information.
6. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); United
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
7. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956).
8. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
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organization under the Subversive Activities Control Act,' and in-
stituted criminal prosecutions.1"
Except for the criminal prosecutions and the registration case, the
courts have upheld the right of agencies to withhold pertinent informa-
tion. In practically all of these cases, however, the benches were
closely divided and strong dissenting opinions were filed.
The difficulties arise from the effort to adjust the competing
interests of the individual, on the one hand, to obtain full disclosure of
information needed by him to present or meet the issues arising in
the adjudicative proceeding, and, on the other, the interest of govern-
ment officials in something less than full disclosure when they believe
disclosure would interfere with effective administration or, in their
opinion, would otherwise be contrary to the public interest. Underlying
these immediate interests are at least two fundamental considerations.
From the standpoint of the government, and in the public interest,
there is a need at present to prevent disclosure of information affecting
the security of the nation. And from the standpoint of the individual,
and also in the public interest, there is the responsibility of the govern-
ment to see that justice is done, which, as applied here, means the
enforcement of procedural due process.
In seeking standards by which to determine the conflicts that occur
from the interaction of these interests, the courts, and the legislatures,
have approached the problem from two different directions. They
seek, first, to determine whether the nature of the individual's interest
that is affected by a refusal to disclose information has any bearing on
the right of the government to withhold information, or, in its more
general aspects, whether standards of procedural due process vary
according to the nature of the individual interest that is affected. And
second, they seek to correlate the right of nondisclosure with the type
of information that is sought to be withheld.
Since these are not mutually exclusive factors they often appear
together in the cases. But for purposes of analysis, this Article will
deal with them separately. The inquiry, however, must first be placed
in an appropriate constitutional context and this calls for an examina-
tion of the legal basis for nondisclosure. 1
9. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 254 F.2d 314 (D.C.
Cir. 1958).
10. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957) ; Roviaro v. United States, 353
U.S. 53 (1957) ; State v. Hunt, 25 N.J. 514, 138 A.2d 1 (1958).
11. The standard texts on the subject are McCoRicic, EVIDENCE 302-13 (1954)
and 8 WIGMoRE, EViDENCE §§ 2367-79 (3d ed. 1940). A recent article dealing with
most of the procedural aspects of the problem is Timbers & Cohen, Demands of
Litigants for Government Information, 18 U. PITT. L. REV. 687 (1957). A percep-
tive brief discussion of the subject is Walkley, The Use of Undisclosed Ezidence by
GOVERNMENTAL NONDISCLOSURE
THE LEGAL BASIS FOR NONDISCLOSURE
"[T]here appears to be no principle of testimonial privilege or
basic consideration of policy exempting any officer or agent of the
state from the duty to give such testimony as may be required in a
duly held judicial investigation," said Judge Fuld for the New York
Court of Appeals in 1953.' This reflects a basic tenet of the law of
evidence.'
Such requirement of disclosure is, in criminal cases, identified with
the constitutional right under the sixth amendment of a defendant "to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation" and "to be con-
fronted with the witness against him ;" and, as to both criminal and civil
cases, the due process clauses of both the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments are safeguards against unfair procedural practices.
However, the common law of evidence has long recognized certain
"rules of privilege" which authorize the withholding of pertinent facts
in a judicial proceeding, and these common-law rules presumably are
read into the Constitution. Said Professor McCormick:
"They do not in any wise aid the ascertainment of truth, but
rather they shut out the light. Their sole warrant is the protection
of interests and relationships which, rightly or wrongly, are re-
garded as of sufficient social importance to justify some incidental
sacrifice of sources of facts needed in the administration of
justice." 14
Such privilege applies to marital communications, communications
between client and lawyer, information secured in the course of the
physician-patient relationship, confessions, self-incriminating statements
and evidence illegally obtained. 5 In addition, a similar evidential privi-
lege is said to apply to "governmental secrets." "I
But a distinction should be made between the governmental privi-
lege and an individual's privileged communications. The latter obvi-
Government Officials in Administrative and Judicial Proceedings, 45 CALIF. L. REv.
524 (1957). See also AL.LEN, LAW AND ORDERS 369-85 (2d ed. 1956) (the problem
in England) ; and PtmIic LAW PROBLEMS IN INDIA (Ebb ed. 1957), a survey report
which finds that this problem both in the United States and India is one that requires
further research. For a discusion of the problem as it relates to the legislature, see
Bishop, The Executive Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Cnstitutional Question, 66
YALE LJ. 477 (1957).
12. City of Buffalo v. Hanna Furnace Corp., 305 N.Y. 369, 373, 113 N.E.2d 520,
522 (1953).
13. "For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a fundamental
maxim that the public (in the words sanctioned by Lord Hardwicke) has a right to
every man's evidence." 8 WiGMom., op. cit. supra note 11, § 2192.
14. McCoRmicK, op. cit. s'pra note 11, at 152.
15. Id. at 168.
16. Id. at 302; 8 Wiamon, op. cit. supra note 11, §§ 2367-79.
19591
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ously protect private "interests and relationships" and those who claim
them have no legal Obligation other than the protection of their own
interests. The government, on the other hand, particularly where it is
engaged in adjudicative proceedings, not only may have an interest in
withholding information but it also is subject to the constitutional
requirement that its adjudicative proceedings meet procedural due
process standards. In other words, it has the duty of seeing that
justice is done."
Since the common-law evidential privilege of the government may
thus be offset by a duty to provide fair procedure, can an agency's
claim of a right to withhold information be reconciled with the require-
ment of procedural due process?
It is not, in fact, easily reconciled. The best that so far has been
said in support of nondisclosure is that "reasonable" limitations can
and have been imposed on both substantive and procedural rights of due
process."8 If this criterion is accepted, the problem in this area is to
break down and define what are reasonable limitations.
This is true even where the agency's claim of a right to avoid
disclosure is made to rest upon grounds other than the government's
evidentiary privilege. It has been urged occasionally that the executive
agencies have, by virtue of the separation of powers doctrine, an in-
herent right to withhold information under an "executive privilege." "
17. In Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd, 254 F.2d 314
(D.C. Cir. 1958), which required disclosure in a civil adjudicative proceeding of prior
reports made by a Government witness, Judge Prettyman, for the court, pointed out
that "the opinion of the Supreme Court in the Jencks case [which required such
disclosure in a criminal prosecution] . . . is based upon the elementary proposition
that the interest of the United States is that justice be done. The same elementary
proposition applies here and leads to the same result."
18. See Dayton v. Dulles, 254 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd on other grounds,
357 U.S. 144 (1958), where Judge Prettyman said: "A regulation of a liberty, reason-
able in relation to its subject and adopted in the interest of the community, is due
process." But see Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in Shaughnessy v. United States ex
rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (upholding an exclusion order based on confidential infor-
mation) : "Procedural due process is more elemental and less flexible than substantive
due process . . . . Only the untaught layman or the charlatan lawyer can answer
that procedures matter not. Procedural fairness and regularity are of the indispensable
essence of liberty. Severe substantive laws can be endured if they are fairly and
impartially applied. Indeed, if put to the choice, one might well prefer to live under
Soviet substantive law applied in good faith by our common-law procedures than
under our substantive law enforced by Soviet procedural practices. Let it not be over-
looked that due process of law is not for the sole benefit of an accused. It is the
best insurance for the Government itself against those blunders which leave lasting
stains on a system of justice but which are bound to occur on ex parte consideration."
19. See Bishop, The Executive's Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional
Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477 (1957). This "executive privilege" theory has antecedents
in the English doctrine that the King is immune from judicial process, both as to the
requirement of attendance and of divulging information. See Street, State Secrets-A
Comparative Study, 14 MODERN L. REV. 121 (1951).
When the question arose in the treason trial of Aaron Burr, Chief Justice Marshall,
sitting as a trial judge, indicated that he did not believe such immunity applied to
the President because the nature of his office was different from that of the King.
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In many more instances, the provisions of certain general statutes have
been invoked as authorizing, expressly or impliedly, an agency right of
nondisclosure." Thus, in United States ex. rel. Touhy v. Ragen2
and Boske v. Comingore ' regulations restricting access to agency
United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30, 34 (No. 14) (C.C. Va. 1807). See also
CoRwiN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND PowERs 112-13 (4th rev. ed. 1957). Marshall
granted Burr's motion for the issuance of a subpoena directing the President to
appear and testify with respect to certain letters and documents in his possession, but
President Jefferson refused to attend, although he offered to have his deposition
taken in Washington. This offer, apparently, was never acted upon, and the subpoena
was not enforced. The requested documents were eventually produced by the Gov-
ernment's attorney.
No court, however, has ever compelled the chief executive to furnish information
in a judicial proceeding. There appear to be but two decisions on the subject, one
by the highest court of New Jersey and the other by that of Pennsylvania, both of
which held that the separation of powers doctrine barred an order to compel a
governor to disclose information in his possession. Thompson v. German Valley
R.R., 22 N.J. Eq. 111 (Ch. 1871); Appeal of Hartranft, 85 Pa. 433 (1877).
These determinations support a claim of "executive privilege" on the part of the
chief executive, and his right to withhold information at his discretion seems to be
conceded. See H.R. REP. No. 2947, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1956). Professor Wig-
more takes the position, however, that the exemption applies only to the requirement
of attendance at judicial proceedings, and does not apply to the furnishing of infor-
mation. 8 WiGmopE, op. cit. mipra note 11, §§ 2369, 2370.
20. The various authorities relied on by the federal agencies have been analyzed
and classified on the basis of replies to a questionnaire sent to all the agencies by
the House of Representatives Special Subcommittee on Government Information,
H.R. REP. No. 2947, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Ex. III, at 281 (1956).
21. 340 U.S. 462 (1951). This was a habeas corpus proceeding instituted by an
inmate of a state penitentiary against the warden. A subpoena duces tecum was
served on an FBI agent requiring production of certain records which, petitioner
claimed, contained evidence establishing that his conviction was brought about by
fraud. The agent appeared as a witness but declined to produce the records, citing
a regulation of the Department of Justice which required him to refuse to produce
the records on the instructions of the Attorney General. A contempt conviction by
the district court was reversed, the Court, per Mr. Justice Reed, upholding the validity
of the regulation insofar as it applied to subordinate officials, and citing Boske v.
Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1899), as controlling.
22. 177 U.S. 459 (1899) (upholding Treasury Department regulation which
prohibited collectors of internal revenue and their subordinates from providing certain
reports). See also Appeal of SEC, 226 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1955) (contempt order
against general counsel of SEC reversed where counsel refused to produce, in a
stockholder's derivative action, official records on basis of SEC rule prohibiting dis-
closure by subordinate officials).
However, can the chief executive "cast the cloak of immunity" over his subordi-
nates? The only case that seems to have dealt with it is Appeal of Hartranft, 85 Pa.
433 (1877), where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that not only the Governor,
but also those officials who carried out the Governor's orders to have the National
Guard intervene in a strike, were exempt from judicial process. But, where no such
specific directive is present, it is doubtful that a member of an executive department
or an administrative agency can claim to be acting as the "alter ego" of the chief
executive. See Timbers & Cohen, Demands of Litigants for Government Infor-
ination, 18 U. Prrr. L. RE~v. 687, 701 (1957).
Although such regulations have been upheld by the Supreme Court where demands
for information were made upon subordinate agency officials, and where the agency
was not a party to the litigation, they have not been specifically tested in a case
against an agency head where it is unlikely that such a claim would be upheld. See
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in United States ex rel. Touhy v Ragen,
340 U.S. 462, 473 (1951). Furthermore, such a regulation is not applicable to a
criminal prosecution. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957) ; United States v.
Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944). It is questionable that it would be effective
in a civil case where the agency was a party litigant. See United States v. General
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information drafted upon general provisions of the "Housekeeping"
Act of 1789 3 were upheld. Although a recently enacted amendment
to this legislation precludes its further use toward this end,24 the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 contains language which appears
to give considerable leeway to agencies to refuse disclosure.25  But the
constitutional inquiry into procedural due process is not avoided by
statutory enactment. Here also a balance must be struck on the basis
of the nature of the interest affected and the type of information
withheld.
THE NATURE OF THE INTEREST AFFECTED
In dealing with a governmental claim of privilege to withhold
information, the courts have made distinctions based on whether crim-
Motors Corp., 2 F.R.D. 528 (N.D. Ill. 1942), where it is indicated that the Attorney
General's regulation applies only to litigation between private parties. This is
criticized in Timbers & Cohen, Demands of Litigants for Government Information,
18 U. PiTT. L. Rv. 687, 697 (1957). But see McCoisicc, op. cit. Supra note 11,
at 305.
23. Rav. STAT. § 161 (1875), 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1952). This now provides: "The
head of each department is authorized to prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with
law, for the government of his department, the conduct of its officers and clerks,
the distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use and preservation
of the records, papers, and property appertaining to it."
24. Pub. L. No. 619, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 12, 1958), provides, "Section
161 of the Revised Statutes of the United States [5 U.S.C. § 122] is amended by adding
the following new sentence: 'This section does not authorize withholding information
from the public or limiting the availability of records to the public."' For a discussion
of this see Mitchell, Government Secrecy in Theory and Practice: "Rules and Regu-
lation" as an Autonoinous Screen, 58 CoLum. L. REv. 199 (1958).
It should be noted that a federal statute imposes criminal penalties on govern-
ment employees who disclose certain types of information made confidential by statute.
18 U.S.C. § 1906 (1952).
25. 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1952). Apparently under the terms
of the act an agency can withhold information respecting "any function of the United
States requiring secrecy in the public interest" and "any matter relating solely to the
internal management of an agency." Also it need not make available for public
inspection final opinions and orders in the adjudication of cases which are "required
for good cause to be held confidential." In addition, matters of official record may be
withheld when they contain "information held confidential for good cause found."
The courts, however, have not specifically referred to these provisions as a basis
for upholding a claim to withhold information on broader terms than those recog-
nized by the common-law types of privileged information or those specifically pro-
tected by statute.
In the Code of Federal Administrative Procedure proposed by the American Bar
Association Special Committee on Legal Services and Procedure to replace the
Administrative Procedure Act, the various phrases of that act which authorize an
agency to withhold information were eliminated, and the following provision was
made for withholding information: "Exemptions. The provisions of this section shall
not require disclosure of subject matter which is (1) specifically exempt from publi-
cation by statute, (2) required to be kept secret in the protection of the national
security, (3) submitted in confidence pursuant to statute or agency rule or discretion,
or (4) the disclosure of which would be a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy. Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to authorize the with-
holding of information except as specifically stated in this subsection." S. 4094, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 1002(f) (1958).
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inal or civil liabilities were at stake, and also whether the nature of the
interest affected by an adverse agency determination, based on undis-
closed information, was such as to require the full complement of
procedural due process safeguards.
In the criminal cases, Judge Learned Hand's statement in United
States v. Andolschek 26 on this subject has become firmly rooted:
"So far as they directly touch the criminal dealings, the
prosecution necessarily ends any confidential character the docu-
ments may possess; it must be conducted in the open, and will lay
bare their subject matter. The government must choose; either
it must leave the transactions in the obscurity from which a trial
will draw them, or it must expose them fully."
This was recently applied in Jencks v. United States,' where Mr.
Justice Brennan, for the Supreme Court, said that, even though the
Government claimed a privilege to withhold certain reports of its wit-
nesses based on its interest in safeguarding the privacy of its files, "we
hold that the criminal action must be dismissed when the Government,
on the ground of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce,
for the accused's inspection and for admission in evidence, relevant
statements or reports in its possession of government witnesses touch-
ing the subject matter of their testimony at the trial." 28 Other language
in the opinion indicates that even if the claimed privilege involved infor-
mation relating to "vital national interest," the same result would be
26. 142 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944).
27. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
28. Id. at 672. See also State v. Hunt, 25 N.J. 514, 138 A2d 1 (1958). In
reversing a conviction for murder the court there said: "Since the county prosecutor's
primary function is not to convict but to see that justice is done . . . he, as well
as the defense counsel, should readily welcome the wholesome principle which we
now approve for the administration of justice in our State, that where it appears that
a State's witness [a detective vho accompanied the prisoner in transit] has made
prior notes or statements relating to the subject matter of the direct testimony which
he has given, the defense is entitled to inspect and use on cross-examination the prior
notes or statements if they are or can be made available. And the principle is generally
applicable without any preliminary showing of inconsistency . . . or any resulting
right in the State to introduce the notes or statements or corroborative evidence on
its behalf.. . ." Id. at 530-31, 138 A.2d at 10. But see United States v. Nugent,
346 U.S. 1 (1953). In a prosecution for refusal to submit to induction under the
Selective Service Act, defendant, who had claimed exemption as a conscientious ob-
jector, is entitled to a "fair resume" of the FBI report upon which his military classi-
fication is based, but not the report itself. See Blalock v. United States, 247 F.2d 615
(4th Cir. 1957). Contra, United States v. Jacobson, 154 F. Supp. 103 (W.D. Wash.
1957).
It should be noted that in civil and administrative judicial proceedings, where
the requested information is not privileged under the law of evidence or by statute,
the Jencks rule is applicable. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 254 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1958); NLRB v. Adhesive Products
Corp., 258 F2d 403 (2d Cir. 1958).
19581
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reached in a criminal case, although a specific test of that issue has
not yet arisen.29
Following the Jencks decision Congress enacted a statute which
appears to modify Mr. Justice Brennan's language as to dismissal of a
prosecution where relevant statements of Government witnesses are not
produced. It provides:
"If the United States elects not to comply with an order of
the court . . . to deliver to the defendant any such statement, or
such portion thereof as the court may direct, the court shall strike
from the record the testimony of that witness, and the trial shall
proceed unless the court in its discretion shall determine that the
interests of justice require that a mistrial be declared." "
Although Jencks indicates the possibility that no privilege may be
available in criminal prosecutions, this is not true in civil cases. "It is
unquestionably true," said the Court, "that the protection of vital na-
tional interests may militate against public disclosure of documents in
the Government's possession. This has been recognized in decisions of
this Court in civil causes .... ," "' This, apparently, refers to the
secrets of state privilege. But there is little doubt that the other types
of privileged information will also be recognized in civil cases.
However, in a number of instances in recent years, the courts have
applied, in civil cases, not only the recognized evidentiary privileges of
the Government, but a theory that certain kinds of individual interests
affected by Government action are not entitled to as much procedural
protection as other kinds of interests, and that agency determinations
affecting such interests may be based upon undisclosed information,
privileged or not. These lesser interests include, with approval by the
United States Supreme Court, employment in the Government,32 admis-
29. "[In criminal causes," said Mr. Justice Brennan, "'. . . the Government
can invoke its evidentiary privileges only at the price of letting the defendant go free.
The rationale of the criminal cases is that, since the Government which prosecutes
an accused also has the duty to see that justice is done, it is unconscionable to allow
it to undertake prosecution and then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive
the accused of anything which might be material to his defense. . . ."' 353 U.S. at
671, quoting from Mr. Justice Vinson's opinion in United States v. Reynolds, 345
U.S. 1, 12 (1953).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(d) (Supp. V, 1958).
31. 353 U.S. at 670.
32. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally
divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). In that case the Court upheld an agency's refusal
to disclose the names of informants who were responsible for the discharge of a
Government employee on disloyalty grounds. The court of appeals' opinion, which was
sustained, avoided the due process issue by holding that a Government job is not
a property right, the deprivation of which entitles one to a judicial type determination.
In a strong dissent, Judge Edgerton insisted that the dismissal was punitive and
therefore all procedural safeguards of a judicial proceeding were applicable, including
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sion of aliens to the United States,' and applications for suspension of
deportations.3 4 To these has now been added employment in private
companies holding Defense Department contracts.3 5 In each of these
instances confidential and undisclosed information was used by the
agency as a basis for acting adversely to the individual. The justifica-
tion was simply that such interests did not require the same degree of
procedural protection as do other interests.?'
the right to disclosure of the names of informants and the right to cross-examine them.
The views of the dissenting Supreme Court Justices in the Bailey case, supporting
the views of Judge Edgerton on this issue, were expressed in separate opinions in
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
33. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); United
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). In the Mesei case the
excluded alien (his exclusion was based on undisclosed information) had formerly
been a resident of the United States but had traveled abroad for a period of nineteen
months. Because of this, Mr. Justice Clark, for the majority of the Court, ruled that
he was in the same class as an entrant alien. The Supreme Court had previously
ruled that a lawful resident alien "may not captiously be deprived of his constitutional
rights to procedural due process. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953)."
345 U.S. at 213. The dissenting Justices in Mezei were Mr. Justices Black, Douglas,
Frankfurter and Jackson. In the Knauff case the Attorney General had excluded a
woman, married to a naturalized American citizen, stationed in Germany, who sought
admission under the War Brides Act. She was excluded on the basis of confidential
information and without any hearing. Mr. Justices Frankfurter, Jackson and Black
dissented and two Justices, Douglas and Clark, took no part. After this decision
Congress passed a special act providing for Mrs. Knauff's admission to the United
States.
34. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956). The applicant was ordered deported on
the basis of his membership in the Communist Party, such membership terminating
more than ten years before the proceeding was instituted. He had been a resident
of the United States for forty years, had a family and a record of exemplary conduct.
The special inquiry officer, who was assigned to hear his application for suspension
of deportation, found that, on the record, the applicant was entitled to favorable con-
sideration, but recommended denial, on the basis of confidential information, in accord-
ance with a regulation issued by the Attorney General. The case turned on the
validity of such regulation. The majority of the Court held that in suspension of
deportation cases the Attorney General had an "unfettered discretion" and was thus
not required to disclose the information on which he acted. Vigorous dissents were
filed by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justices Black, Frankfurter and Douglas.
35. Greene v. McElroy, 254 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 27 U.S.L.
WEEK 3134 (U.S. Oct. 27, 1958) (No. 180). This was a declaratory judgment
action by an officer-employee of a company engaged in work under a Defense
Department contract, which challenged the revocation of his security clearance by
the Secretary of the Navy. In the administrative adjudicative proceedings leading
to the revocation order, the Government had refused to produce "confidential reports
of the FBI and other investigative agencies" upon which the order was based. It
appears that no claim was made that these reports contained privileged information.
As a result of the Secretary's action the employee was dismissed from his $18,000
per year job in which he had dealt with classified information, and was given a
$4,400 per year job, where he did not have access to such information.
36. In Greene v. McElroy, supra note 35, at 951, the court was troubled by the
thought that the only relief it could grant would be the restoration of the employee
to his position. This "would amount to ordering his restoration to access to classified
information," said the court. But if there was a genuine issue of privilege in the
case, the proper procedure would have been for the agency to file a formal claim of
privilege and for the court to determine for itself that the information is privileged.
If the information were held not to be of a privileged type, the court could order
its production. Failure to produce might be enforced by contempt proceedings
(although this admittedly raises unresolved issues) or, as the post-Jencks statute
indicates, by a requirement that the information be eliminated as a basis of the
agency action. Ultimately, the issue narrows down to the question whether it is
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All but the last case were decided by sharply divided Courts (Bailey
4-4, Mezei 4-3 and Jay 5-4) and the harshness of the results evoked
stinging dissents. Do these decisions provide for "reasonable" limita-
tions on procedural due process? Emphatically not, argue the
dissenters The Greene case, in particular, dealing with private
employment, demonstrates the fact that once erosion of procedural
safeguards gets under way in areas not believed to be important, it
becomes difficult to prevent it from reaching into other areas of ad-
mittedly vital importance. Mr. Justice Jackson's statement that "pro-
cedural due process is more elemental and less flexible than substantive
due process" 38 becomes increasingly significant.
TYPES OF INFORMATION THAT MAY BE PRIVILEGED
As part of the common law of evidence certain kinds of information
in the hands of governmental agencies have been deemed privileged.
Such privilege is said to apply to "secrets of state", "informers" and
"official information." a'
In the light of recent developments in this field, it may be helpful,
for the purposes of this discussion, to break these down into several
additional categories, as follows: (1) secrets of state, (2) identity of
informers of violations of law, and in some instances, the contents of the
information furnished by informers, (3) information obtained by
investigation, and (4) communications relating to the internal manage-
ment of agencies. In addition to these common-law subjects, there are
the subjects which have been made privileged by statute, which we will
identify as (5) information furnished an agency as required by statute.
the court or the agency which has the final authority to decide that information can
be withheld. But in this case the court did not meet this issue because it found that
the kind of interest affected was one not entitled to these procedural safeguards.
37. In Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 361 (1956), Mr. Chief Justice Warren said: "In
conscience, I cannot agree with the opinion of the majority. It sacrifices to form
too much of the American spirit of fair play in both our judicial and administrative
processes." In the Mezei case, Mr. Justice Jackson said: "Our law may, and rightly
does, place more restrictions on the alien than on the citizen. But basic fairness
in hearing procedures does not vary with the status of the accused. If the procedures
used to judge this alien are fair and just, no good reason can be given why they
cannot be extended to simplify the condemnation of citizens. If they would be unfair
to citizens, we cannot defend the fairness of them when applied to the more helpless
and handicapped alien." Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,
225 (1953).
38. Id. at 224.
39. UNIFORm RuLEs OF EVIDENCE 33, 34, 36; & WlGoRE, op. cit. supra note 11,
§ 2367. See generally HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORm STATE LAWs (1953). The Uniform Rules, insofar as governmental
privilege is concerned, are practically the same as those in the MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE
rules 227, 228, 230 (1942).
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Secrets of State
Information "involving the public security or concerning the
military or naval organizations or plans of the United States, or a
State or Territory, or concerning international relations" has been
defined as "secrets of state." 'o Although there are not many cases
in which the issue has arisen, it is generally agreed that an agency's
claim of privilege to withhold such information will be upheld in civil
adjudication before agencies and courts 4 although possibly not in
criminal cases."
The obvious purpose of this privilege is to protect information in
the possession of the Government which might be used to the nation's
disadvantage by its actual or possible enemies. Since it deals with
military affairs and international relations, there would be some con-
stitutional basis for it, at least where the Chief Executive is concerned,
as he is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and has a non-
reviewable discretion in the handling of foreign affairs.3
The only case in which the Supreme Court appears to have
directly applied the privilege to withhold military information in
derogation of individual interest is Totten v. United States." There,
the Court upheld the dismissal of an action brought by the administrator
of the estate of one Lloyd for payment of a salary under an alleged
agreement made between President Lincoln and Lloyd whereby Lloyd
was to spy behind the Confederate lines during the Civil War and was
to be paid two hundred dollars per month plus expenses. All he had
received was reimbursement for expenses. Mr. Justice Field, for the
Court, stated that compared to the husband-wife or attorney-client
privilege "much greater reason exists for the application of the prin-
ciple to cases of contract for secret services with the Government.
40. UNiFOR RuLEs OF EViDENCE 33; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 227 (1942).
41. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, in United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7
(1953), stated that the privilege against revealing military secrets is "a privilege
which is well established in the law of evidence." Professor Wigmore who, accord-
ing to the Chief Justice was one of "the most outspoken critics of governmental claim
to privilege," called this a "genuine testimonial privilege." 8 WIGMRE, op. cit. supra
note 11, § 2378. See also McCoRmiCK, op. cit. supra note 11, at 302.
42. See note 29 supra.
43. In Chicago & So. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111
(1948) (holding that a CAB order denying a certificate for an overseas air service,
which was subject to approval by the President, could not be reviewed), Mr.
Justice Jackson, for the Court, said: "The President, both as Commander-in-Chief
and as the Nation's organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose
reports are not and ought not to be published to the world. It would be intolerable
that courts, without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify
actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret."
44. 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
45. Id. at 107. "Both employer and the agent must have understood that the
lips of the other were to be for ever sealed respecting the relation of either to the
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As the Uniform Rules of Evidence definition shows, secrets of
state include information concerning international relations, as well as
that relating to military security. Where such information is utilized
by the President of the United States, it is clearly privileged.4 6 It has
also been claimed by other officials. In Briehl v. Dulles,4' the Secretary
of State had refused to renew a passport on the basis of secret informa-
tion indicating that the applicant had communist affiliations. Judge
Prettyman, for the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, stated
that the foreign policy of the United States was based upon the
proposition that the "Communist movement today is an international
conspiracy aimed at world domination and a threat to the internal
security of this country" 48 and also, that "foreign affairs and decisions
on foreign policy are political matters entrusted by the Constitution
to the political departments of the Government, and . . . the judiciary
has no part in them." ' In view of these things, the court held that
the Secretary of State had a right to withhold information relating to
applicant's alleged communist activities, and the right to refuse to renew
the passport on the basis of such secret information.' °
matter. This condition of the engagement was implied from the nature of the employ-
ment, and is implied in all secret employments of the government in time of war,
or upon matters affecting our foreign relations, where a disclosure of the service
might compromise or embarrass our government in its public duties, or endanger
the person or injure the character of the agent." Id. at 106. See also 8 WiGMoE,
op. cit. supra note 11, §2378(a). In Pollen v. United States, 85 Ct. Cl. 673, 681
(1937), the court said that the privilege against disclosure of military secrets "is
predicated upon the principle of the public good, and the right of the Sovereign to
maintain an efficient National defense-a public interest of such paramount importance
as in and of itself transcends the individual interests of a private citizen." Other
cases in which the privilege to withhold military secrets has been applied in derogation
of private right are Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 26 F. Supp. 583 (E.D.N.Y.
1939) (a patent infringement suit wherein the court denied a motion for the pro-
duction of drawings showing the construction of certain apparatus for the Navy);
and Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 Fed. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1912)
(exhibits relating to drawings of an armor-piercing projectile manufactured for the
Navy expunged from the record). But see Bank Line Ltd. v. United States, 68 F.
Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) (an order requiring the production of a record of the
United States Board of Investigation relating to a collision between ships at Casa-
information which the Government withholds from the public see Parks, Secrecy and
presently involved"). For a detailed discussion of the various kinds of military
information which the Government withholds from the public see Parks, Secrecy and
the Public Interest in, Military Affairs, 26 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 23 (1957).
46. Chicago & So. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948);
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
47. 248 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd on other grounds sub nwin. Kent v.
Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
48. Id. at 565.
49. Id. at 567.
50. Judges Bazelon, Edgerton and Fahy dissented, writing separate opinions.
Aside from the statutory and constitutional questions raised, it is doubtful that an
individual's purported communist associations had a real bearing on the conduct of
foreign affairs by the State Department. See also Dayton v. Dulles, 254 F.2d 71
(D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 357 U.S. 144 (1958). See Republic of
China v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 142 F. Supp. 551 (D.C. Md. 1956) (com-
munications between Department of State and British Foreign Office held privileged).
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When limited to the subjects of military and international affairs
there should be relatively little difficulty in applying the secrets of state
privilege. Unfortunately, courts are sometimes persuaded to attach
the secrets of state label to unrelated matters, and thus dissipate the
value of a rather clear-cut distinction.
The Informer Privilege
A full and informative statement of the common-law "informer
privilege," namely, the government's right to withhold the identity of
one who furnishes information of a violation of law, and sometimes the
content of his information, was recently made by Mr. Justice Burton
in Roviaro v. United States 1 as follows:
"What is usually referred to as the informer's privilege is in
reality the Government's privilege to withhold from disclosure
the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of
law to officers charged with enforcement of that law. Scher v.
United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254; In re Quarles and Butler, 158
U.S. 532; Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311, 316. The purpose of the
privilege is the furtherance and protection of the public interest
in effective law enforcement. The privilege recognizes the obliga-
tion of citizens to communicate their knowledge of the commission
of crimes to law-enforcement officials and, by preserving their
anonymity, encourages them to perform that obligation.
"The scope of the privilege is limited by its underlying purpose.
Thus, where the disclosure of the contents of a communication will
not tend to reveal the identity of an informer, the contents are
not privileged. Likewise, once the identity of the informer has
been disclosed to those who would have cause to resent the com-
munication, the privilege is no longer applicable.
"A further limitation on the applicability of the privilege arises
from the fundamental requirements of fairness. Where the
disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his
communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused,
or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must
give way. In these situations the trial court may require disclosure
and, if the Government withholds the information, dismiss the
action ...
"We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is
justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing the public
interest in protecting the flow of information against the indi-
vidual's right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance
renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular
circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime
51. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
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charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the
informer's testimony, and other relevant factors." 2
There is little that can be added to this, except to note that the
Court actually held in the Roviaro case that the privilege was not there
available because it was sought on behalf of one who actively partici-
pated in the investigative process, leading to the apprehension of the
defendant. One who is such a participant is not protected by the
informer privilege, the Court said, and the Government must disclose
his identity to the defense in the course of the prosecution for the crime
investigated. The essence of Roviaro seems to be that it lies within the
discretion of the court to determine whether the informer privilege
is available in a criminal prosecution after "balancing the public interest
in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to
prepare his defense." "
Implicit in the Roviaro decision is a theory of waiver arrived at
by an examination of the underlying purpose of the informer privilege.
Once an individual takes it upon himself to step out of the role of simply
transmitting information to a law enforcement officer, 4 he elects to
give up the right of anonymity with which the privilege clothes him."'
There is very little authority on the applicability of the informer
privilege to civil cases, although "violations of law" may be of a civil
nature which administrative agencies have a duty of policing, as for
instance, unfair labor practices by the National Labor Relations
Board. The fact that the violator on the one hand generally is not
seeking to hide, and the injured party on the other, is likely to seek
redress, limits the need for encouraging the flow of this kind of informa-
52. Id. at 59-62. The Uniform Rules of Evideixe define the privilege as fol-
lows: "Rule 36. Identity of Informer. A witness has a privilege to refuse to
disclose the identity of a person who has furnished information purporting to disclose
a violation of a provision of the laws of this State or of the United States to a repre-
sentative of the State or the United States or a governmental division thereof, charged
with the duty of enforcing that provision, and evidence thereof is inadmissible, unless
the judge finds that (a) the identity of the person furnishing the information has
already been otherwise disclosed, or (b) disclosure of his identity is essential to assure
a fair determination of the issues."
53. The difficulty of exercising such discretion was manifested in a recent decision
by the Supreme Court of California, where a divided court held that a policeman is
required to disclose the names of informers whose information led to a search, without
a warrant, of a narcotic suspect's home. Only if such identity is disclosed, the court
felt, can it make a fair determination of the reasonableness of the search. Dissenting
judges maintained that it did not come within the scope of the Roviaro case because
the informer was not a participant. Priestly v. Superior Court, 330 P.2d 39 (Cal.
Sup. Ct. 1958). See text following note 57 infra.
54. See People v. Roban, 45 N.Y.S.2d 213 (Magis. Ct. 1943) (In a prosecution
for sending threatening letters, the government is privileged not to disclose the identity
of an informer who wrote to the Police Department accusing complainant of prosti-
tution.).. Contra, Priestly v. Superior Ct., supra note 53.
55. As Mr. Justice Burton pointed out in the Roviaro case, once the identity
of the informer has been disclosed the privilege is no longer available. 353 U.S. at
60, citing the following cases: Sorrentino v. United States, 163 F.2d 627 (9th Cir.
1947); Pihl v. Morris, 319 Mass. 577, 66 N.E.2d 804 (1946).
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tion to the agencies. However, the issue has arisen in several antitrust
suits, where it was held that the informer privilege was available to
the Government, mainly on the ground that such a proceeding was
comparable to a criminal action." More recently, though, it has been
narrowly construed and found unavailable where the "statements would
not embarrass the informants in their social relations or their employ-
ment or endanger their safety" and the Government voluntarily dis-
closed the names. '
Information Obtained by Investigation
Closely related to the information which is protected by the fairly
well defined informer privilege, but distinguishable from it in a material
way, is information assembled by agencies by investigation. In the
investigative process, unsolicited information from dutiful citizens is a
negligible factor. It mainly includes information obtained either by
members of the agency staff, paid operatives, or voluntary participants
in the actual investigation. The question often arises whether persons
who are affected by an investigation or who, in litigation, can further
56. United States v. Deere & Co., 9 F.R.D. 523 (D. Minn. 1949). The United
States instituted an injunction proceeding against Deere under the antitrust laws
charging that Deere sought to compel dealers in its farm implements to handle only
its own line of machinery and cancelled contracts of dealers who refused to comply.
The Government counsel had sent a five-page questionnaire to each of defendant's
former dealers. Defendant moved, under rule 34 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
to compel the Government to permit defendant to inspect copies of all the answers
received from the former dealers. The motion was denied by the district court. "The
considerations which require the withholding of information and its source, from
the accused by the Government in criminal cases, are present also in anti-trust actions
brought for the public interest by the Government." Id. at 526. See also United
States v. Kohler Co., 9 F.R.D. 289 (E.D. Pa. 1949). In the Deere case the court
went beyond the accepted limits of the common-law privilege, since the defendant
contended that the names of the informants were already known. Nevertheless the
court held that to divulge the information would destroy the "confidential relationship
between the Government and its informants and seriously impede the Government's
efforts in other similar investigations." United States v. Deere & Co., supra at 527.
Accord, Lewis v. Roux Trucking Corp., 222 App. Div. 204, 226 N.Y. Supp. 70 (1927).
This was a negligence action where one of the parties made an application to inspect
the records of the District Attorney, who was not a party to the action, to produce
reports filed in his office of investigations of the accident, which reports had been made
for the purpose of determining whether a crime had been committed. Despite the
fact that the informants were known to all parties, the court upheld the assertion of
governmental privilege, saying, "The injury to be apprehended to the public interest
from not following that course is greater than the injury which may accrue to the
private individuals seeking justice as a result of denying to them access to the public
prosecutor's memoranda." Id. at 212, 226 N.Y. Supp. at 79. This decision has been
strongly criticized by Professor Wigmore. 8 WmoRE, EviDENCE § 775 (3d ed. 1940).
But see Application of Heller, 184 Misc. 75, 53 N.Y.S.2d 86 (Sup. Ct. 1945). In a
habeas corpus proceeding to determine the custody of a child a subpoena duces tecum
was served on the District Attorney for New York County requiring him to produce
records of certain conversations of persons related to the case. The District Attorney's
assertion of privilege was denied and the motion to inspect the records was granted,
the court saying that the informer privilege was a qualified privilege and depended
upon the public safety. Since in this case there was no element of public safety, the
privilege was held not to be available.
57. Mitchell v. Bass, 252 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1958).
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their causes by disclosure of the information assembled, may be barred
from obtaining it by an agency privilege of nondisclosure.
In the Roviaro case the Supreme Court made clear that informa-
tion obtained by investigation, when relevant to the defense in a criminal
prosecution, is not protected by the informer privilege. The petitioner
in that case had been convicted for knowingly possessing and trans-
porting heroin imported unlawfully. He was apprehended as a result
of the cooperation with the police of an undercover informer who had
directed the police to the place where the petitioner delivered the heroin
and had himself been the recipient of the heroin from the accused.
Before and during the trial the accused's attorney sought the disclosure
of the identity of this informer but the trial court denied the applications
on the basis of the informer privilege and the court of appeals affirmed.
But the Supreme Court reversed these decisions on the ground that
the informer privilege was inapplicable because "the Government's
informer was the sole participant other than the accused, in the trans-
action charged." 11 By thus becoming a participant in the investigative
process, the underlying purpose of the informer privilege, namely, the
encouragement of private citizens to bring to the attention of law
enforcement officers violations of law is dissolved. It is noteworthy that
the Court did not apply the so-called "official information" privilege,
of which more will be said shortly.
The rule in the Roviaro case was carried one step further by the
New Jersey Supreme Court, which recently held that where the partici-
pant in the investigative process was a paid functionary, he is not a
proper person on whose behalf the informer privilege can be invoked.59
That was an action for a declaratory judgment and for an injunction
brought by a county attorney to restrain a legislative committee investi-
gating wire-tapping from requiring the disclosure of the identity of
persons employed by him as wire-tappers, as well as the information
obtained by them. The court held that the common-law informer
privilege was not available on behalf of persons who were "outside"
operatives for the county attorney.
At about the same time the United States Supreme Court ruled in
the Jencks case that, in a criminal prosecution, the written reports of
paid operatives of the FBI who testified at the trial and touching the
events and activities as to which they testified were not privileged and
must be produced upon the application of the defendant. The right to
58. 353 U.S. at 64. But see People v. Alaniz, 149 Cal. App. 2d 560, 309 P.2d 71
(Dist. Ct. App. 1957). In a prosecution for the unlawful possession of heroin, the
court upheld the Government's claim of privilege not to disclose the identity of an
informer.
59. Morss v. Forbes, 24 N.J. 341, 132 A.2d 1 (1957).
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such disclosure, as we have seen, has now also been applied in civil
cases.
60
To what extent, it may be asked, are such rules inconsistent with
the so-called "official information" privilege that is said to have common
law origins?"' If, for the moment, we subtract from such official
information communications relating to internal management, a subject
discussed in the following section,, is there anything left? The re-
mainder is a no man's land that can only be described as information
that should be privileged because an agency asserts that it is in the
"public interest" to do so.' Except in several instances where statutes
so provide, in very few cases has this been a basis for consideration by
the courts independently of more specifically identified privileges.
4
In 1927, the United States Supreme Court refused to recognize a
claim of privilege broadly based on the public interest. The issue in
the case was whether the Commissioner of Internal Revenue could be
required by subpoena duces tecum to make available to a taxpayer in-
formation contained in the tax returns of twelve corporations similarly
situated and who had received certain statutory benefits not made
available to the taxpayer. The Court held that, even though the
information was made confidential by statute, a privilege was not
available when its disclosure was necessary in a judicial proceeding. 5
It may well be that most of such information would, in a judicial
proceeding, be held incompetent on hearsay grounds, and therefore
60. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 254 F.2d 314 (D.C.
Cir. 1958) ; NLRB v. Adhesive Prod. Corp., 258 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1958).
61. Uniform Rides of Evidence define this as follows: "Rule 34. Official Infor-
naltimt. (1) As used in this rule, 'official information' means information not open or
theretofore officially disclosed to the public relating to internal affairs of this state
or of the United States acquired by a public official of this State or the United States
in the course of his duty, or transmitted from one such official to another in the
course of duty. (2) A witness has a privilege to refuse to disclose a matter on the
ground that it is official information, and evidence of the matter is inadmissible if
the judge finds that the matter is official information, and (a) disclosure is forbidden
by an Act of Congress of the United States or a statute by the State, or (b) disclosure
of the information in the action will be harmful to the interests of the government
of which the witness is an officer in its governmental capacity."
62. See Judge Mars' opinion in Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987 (3d
Cir. 1951), rev'd, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). In reviewing the various common-law privileges,
he said: "[T]here is also a less clearly defined privilege against disclosing official infor-
mation if such disclosure will actually be harmful to the interests of the nation.' Id.
at 994. In England, it might be noted, such a "public interest" standard is applicable
and has been strongly criticized. ALLEN, LAW AN ) O wDas 370 (2d ed. 1956).
63. See Jessup v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 2d 102, 311 P.2d 177 (Dist. Ct
App. 1957), applying the provision of the California Code of Civil Procedure pro-
hibiting disclosure "when the public interest would suffer."
64. See United States v. Deere & Co., 9 F.R.D. 523 (D. Mmin. 1949), and United
States v. Kohler Co., 9 F.R.D. 289 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
65. Blair v. Oesterlein, 275 U.S. 220 (1927). See also Bowles v. Ackerman,
4 F.R.D. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1945). In an action by Price Administrator to enjoin viola-
tion of maximum price order, information obtained from defendant by investigators
is not privileged.
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unavailable to the litigant in any event. Judge Prettyman, in the
Communist Party case, on this ground, excluded the reports of a witness
which were not written by the witness, but were accounts of conversa-
tions of the witness reported by others."
Another element which occasionally arises in connection with
"official information" is information received by an agency "in con-
fidence." This may refer to such subjects as are made confidential by
statute, and also information provided by an informer. Information
furnished by staff members, paid operatives, and other participants in
the investigative process is, we assume, "in confidence," but as the
Roviaro and Jencks cases show, this fact alone does not create a
privilege."
The net result appears to be that information obtained by investiga-
tion is not privileged per se. Its various aspects, however, have not
been fully explored and it would be premature to assert that no privilege
at all is available to the government. It is quite possible that an agency
can satisfy a court that in a particular case disclosure would be, on
balance, more harmful to the interests of the state than the resultant
injury to the party seeking the information. The courts may find it
easier to reach a decision where they can start with some identifiable
privileged subject matter, such as secrets of state. In the circumstances
here presented, however, they must make the determination without such
assistance.
Communications Relating to Internal Management of Agencies
One side result of the notorious Army-McCarthy hearings in 1954
was the focusing of attention on one of the more perplexing of the
privileged communications problems, namely, the right to withhold
information "transmitted from one such (public) official to another
in the course of duty." 1s At the hearings, a letter dated May 17, 1954,
from President Eisenhower to the Secretary of Defense, was introduced,
together with a supporting memorandum of law by the Attorney
General, the letter stating in part as follows:
66. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 254 F.2d 314, 325
(D.C. Cir. 1958).
67. "There is a vast difference between confidential and privileged. Almost any
communication, even an ordinary letter, may be confidential. . . . But privileged
means that the contents are of such character that the law as a matter of public policy
protects them against disclosure. A communication from a person to his banker may
be confidential, but it is not privileged; certain of his communications to his doctor
or his lawyer are not only confidential but also privileged; the law does not permit
their disclosure even under subpoena by a court." Judge Prettyman, in Communist
Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 254 F.2d 314, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
68. UNIFORm RULES OF EVIDENCE 34. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 228 (1942).
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"Because it is essential to efficient and effective administration
that employees of the Executive branch be in a position to be com-
pletely candid in advising with each other on official matters, and
because it is not in the public interest that any of their conversa-
tions or communications, or any documents or reproductions,
concerning such advice be disclosed, you will instruct employees
of your department that in all of their appearances before the
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Government Operations,
regarding the inquiry now before it, they are not to testify to any
such conversations or communications or to produce any such
documents or reproductions. This principle must be maintained
regardless of who would be benefited by such disclosures.
"I direct this action so as to maintain the proper separation
of powers between the Executive and Legislative branches of the
Government in accordance with my responsibilities and duties
under the Constitution. This separation is vital to preclude the
exercise of arbitrary power by any branch of the Government." 69
These instructions raise two distinct problems. First, they have been
loosely referred to as an exercise of the "executive privilege," 70 meaning
the more or less well recognized right of a chief executive, the President
of the United States, or the governor of a state, to withhold information
in his possession .71  The second problem, and the one which concerns
us here, involves the internal management of agencies; namely, their
right to withhold from litigants pertinent intra- and inter-departmental
communications among administrative officials. Such communications
might deal with personnel matters, budgetary information, advice given
by a subordinate official to a superior, consultations amongst associates
or exchanges of information among different departments. These
communications may have a definite bearing on action to be taken with
respect to outside persons or be mainly of an administrative or "house-
keeping" kind.'
The right to withhold such information in judicial proceedings is
a subject that has, until recently, received only perfunctory treatment
69. N.Y. Times, May 18, 1954, p. 24, col. 1. Although this communication is
concerned with disclosure of information in congressional hearings, it probably would
be asserted also in a judicial proceeding. Despite the fact that this communication was
directed specifically to the Secretary of Defense, nineteen departments and agencies of
the federal government reported that they based their authority to restrict or withhold
information on this letter. H.R. REP. No. 2947, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1956). See
also President Eisenhower's letter of Jan. 22, 1958, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1958, p. 10,
col. 3.
70. H.R. REP. No. 2947, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1956).
71. See note 19 supra.
72. See H.R. REP. No. 2947, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, 107 (1956), for a breakdown
of the various types of information to which federal departments attach restrictions.
See also Bank Line Ltd. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). The
court would not accept a contention that a record of an investigation of a collision
between ships was "housekeeping" information entitled to a privilege of nondisclosure.
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by the courts in the United States. Zacher v. United States,73 for
instance, involved a communication from a United States attorney to
the Attorney General recommending that a pending prosecution for
filing a fraudulent income tax return be dropped. Defendant's attorney
sought, by subpoena duces tecum, to have the letter produced, but the
court upheld the quashing of the subpoena, saying only: "It seems clear
that the letter to the Attorney General was a confidential and privileged
communication, and accordingly the motion to suppress was properly
sustained." 74
President Eisenhower's letter was mainly concerned with com-
munications relating to exchanges of advice among Government officials,
which is probably the most sensitive of the internal management areas.
This problem was recently dealt with by Mr. Justice Reed, sitting
by assignment in the Court of Claims.' The case involved an action
for damages by an aluminum company against the United States, acting
through the Liquidator of War Assets, for breach of contract. It was
alleged that, in violation of a most-favored-purchaser clause in the
contract, aluminum plants were sold by the Government to plaintiff's
competitors on better terms than to plaintiff. An application was made
for the Government to produce an advisory memorandum made by a
member of the staff to the Liquidator of War Assets concerning these
sales. The Government refused to produce this document and filed a
formal claim of privilege. Mr. Justice Reed upheld this claim on the
ground that it was contrary to public interest to compel the disclosure
of an advisory opinion on intra-office policy. He said:
"Free and open comments on the advantages and disad-
vantages of a proposed course of governmental management would
be adversely affected if the civil servant or executive assistant were
compelled by publicity to bear the blame for error or bad judgment
properly chargeable to the responsible individual with the power
to decide and act. Government from its nature has necessarily been
granted a certain freedom from control beyond that given the
citizen. It is true that it now submits itself to suit but it must
retain privileges for the good of all.
"There is a public policy involved in this claim of privilege
for this advisory opinion-the policy of open, frank discussion
between subordinate and chief concerning administrative action." 76
73. 227 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 993 (1955).
74. Id. at 226.
75. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl.
1958).
76. Id. at 945-46. See also the Canadian case of Reese v. The Queen [1955]
Can. Exch. 187, [1955] 3 D.L.R. 2d 691. In that case a veteran had made an agree-
ment with a Government agency for the purchase of certain lands as well as the
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Another aspect of the internal affairs privilege is the question of
the availability to litigants of pertinent information contained in govern-
ment files. Although such material may in any event be excluded on
hearsay grounds, some cases that have dealt with the issue take the
unelaborated position that it is privileged."
But in the Communist Party case the court made a deep inroad
into such a privilege, if indeed there is one, by holding that where the
"records of an executive department maintained in the course of carry-
ing out its functions" are shown to contain evidence contradictory to
the testimony of a government witness, such records must be produced
upon the request of an opposing party. The particular records in that
case were those concerning the compensation paid by the Government
to the witness as an informer."
This is undoubtedly further than any court has gone on this
question. It does not entirely destroy the right of an agency to with-
hold information of a "housekeeping" nature, but it underlines the
principle that where the disclosure of such information, in a particular
instance, cannot be shown to be harmful to the agency, its disclosure
will be required.
mineral rights in such land. In an action on the agreement by successors in interest
it was necessary to prove that the agency had the right to make the sale, and this
proof was contained in certain documents and letters exchanged between different
agencies and by divisions of the same agency. A motion for the production of these
documents was denied on the ground that it was contrary to the public interest to
compel the disclosure of inter-departmental correspondence. Said the court: "If they
[communications between officials] were made with the knowledge that they might
later be subject to disclosure in the Courts, they would in many cases be shorn of that
candor, completeness and freedom of expression which is desirable in such matters.
They would tend to become more cautious and reserved and expressions of opinion
would be affected by the possibility of subsequent public disclosure. The officials
of the state would be hampered in the performance of their proper functions." Id. at
197, [1955] 3 D.L.R. at 701. See Willis, Discovery Against Crown in Right of
Canada When Defendant in Civil Proceeding, 33 CAN. B. REv. 1186 (1955).
77. Universal Airlines, Inc. v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 188 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.
1951). Said the court: "The Board [CAB] contends, however, that it is an error to
compel an agent of the Board to produce any of the Board's reports, orders or private
files or to testify as to the contents of such private papers. This contention seems
sound and supported by the authorities." Id. at 1000. No authorities, however, are
cited. But see Bowles v. Ackerman, 4 F.R.D. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1945). Where the
Price Administrator brings an action to enjoin the violation of a maximum price order
and for penalties, the defendant has the right to examine an attorney in the office of
the Price Administrator with respect to information in his files pertaining to the
defendant.
78. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 254 F,2d 314 (D.C.
Cir. 1958). "We do not rely upon Jencks v. United States, supra, or Public Law
No. 85-269 for our conclusion that the records of Markward's compensation from the
F.B.I. must be produced, since these records are not 'statements' of the witness but
are rather records of an executive department maintained in the course of carrying
out its functions. Our conclusion is based on the general proposition, exemplified by
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that, where one party to an action
is shown to have documentary evidence contradictory to the testimony of one of its
witnesses, production of such documents is required upon request of an opposing party."
Id. at 330.
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Information Furnished by Persons as Required by Statute79
The extension of governmental activities into the areas of employ-
ment, health, relief, increased taxation and the like made it essential that
information relating to these matters be obtained from affected persons
and organizations. The applicable statutes therefore require such
information to be furnished, but, because of the difficult enforcement
problems that would result from a reluctance on the part of individuals
to make public matters they consider of a private nature, the disclosure
of the data is restricted or barred to encourage cooperation.80
The degree of restriction varies in the many applicable statutes.
In most cases the statute simply classifies the information as confidential,
which is sufficient to exclude the public from access to it; but such a
classification does not constitute a basis for a right to refuse disclosure
in judicial proceedings. 8' In some instances, however, the statutes
recognize that the issue of privilege may arise in judicial proceedings.
Thus, it is sometimes provided that the confidential information is to
be made available in any litigation upon the service of a subpoena duces
tecum; 2 or it is to be made available only where the agency itself is a
party to the action; 8 or that it is to be excluded even where required
in judicial proceedings.84
79. An exhaustive collection of statutory materials on this subject appears in
8 WiGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2377 (3d ed. 1940, Supp 1957).
80. Professor Wigmore explains it as follows: "[M]any situations exist where
the information can best be obtained only from the person himself whose affairs are
desired to be known by the Government. An attempt to do so by mere compulsion
might be tedious and ineffective. And where the ultimate purpose to be served is
administrative, and not penal, it may well be that the Government can afford to
promise secrecy in respect to purposes penal or litigious, as the price of readily
achieving its administrative purpose when it demands a report of the truths.
"It is some such principle that justifies the modern creation of a number of
privileges, all statutory in origin, covering sundry matters required by law to be
reported to som administrative official." 8 WiGIaoE, EVIDENCE § 2377, at 761 (3d
ed. 1940).
81. Blair v. Oesterlein Co., 275 U.S. 220 (1927).
82. See Marceau v. Orange Realty, Inc., 97 N.H. 497, 92 A2d 656 (1952).
83. The New York Unemployment Insurance Law provides as follows: "In-
formation acquired from employers or employees pursuant to this article shall be
for the exclusive use and information of the commissioner in the discharge of his
duties hereunder and shall not be open to the public nor be used in any court in
any action or proceeding pending therein unless the commissioner is a party to such
action or proceeding, notwithstanding any other provision of law." N.Y. LAB. LAW
§ 537. This section was applied in Eston v. Backer, 204 Misc. 162, 119 N.Y.S.2d
273 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
84. See It re Bakers Mut. Ins. Co., 301 N.Y. 21, 92 N.E.2d 49 (1950), which
involved a provision of the Sanitary Code of the City of New York requiring that
physicians file certificates of death and separate confidential medical reports indi-
cating the cause of death, which reports "shall be regarded and treated as a con-
fidential and privileged communication, and shall not be subject to subpoena or open
to inspection for any reason whatsoever, other than for scientific purposes approved
by the Board of Health." The court indicated that such a statute did not raise a
constitutional question.
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Since there does not appear to be any correlation between the type
of statute and the nature of the subject matter, we indicate the various
categories of subjects which may be classed as confidential, insofar as
the public alone is concerned, and also those to which there may be a
right of nondisclosure in judicial proceedings.
The restrictions are placed on information provided by individuals
as required by law with respect to income tax returns and other tax
information,85 trade secrets and names of customers,"' applications for
patents,87 records relating to the regulation of business, utilities and
banks,s information relating to the mediation of labor disputes,"
accident reports,' records relating to public health,9 and records of
85. See N.Y. TAx LAW § 202. "Secrecy Required of Officials... Except in accord-
ance with proper judicial order or as otherwise provided by law, it shall be unlawful
for any tax commissioner, or officer or employee of the department of taxation and
finance, . . . to divulge or make known in any manner the amount of income or
any particulars set forth or disclosed in any report under this article." A federal
statute provides that after the income tax has been determined, the returns "shall
be public records" but may be inspected only upon order of the President and under
regulations of the Secretary of Treasury. 53 Stat. 29 (1940), 26 U.S.C. § 55 (1952).
See Lewy v. United States, 29 F.2d 462 (7th Cir. 1928) (an original tax return
may be furnished to the United States Attorney for use in court). See also In re
Estate of Fife, 164 Ohio St. 449, 132 N.E2d 185 (1956) (Rev. Code of Ohio § 5711.11,
providing that "returns filed with county auditor showing income yield of productive
investments or taxable property shall not be open for public inspection," held not to
prohibit the issuance of a subpoena for the returns and their introduction as evidence.)
86. 38 Stat. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1952).
87. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1952).
88. See The Pennsylvania Securities Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 53 (Supp.
1957). "Disclosure of Information forbidden . . . Neither the members of the com-
mission nor the secretary . . . or other employe of the commission, shall publish or
divulge to any one any information contained in or ascertained from any examination
or investigation made by the commission, or any letter, report, or statement sent to
the commission, or any other paper or document in the custody of the commission,
except . . . when the production of such information is required by subpoena or
other legal process of a court of competent jurisdiction . . . ." See also the Rhode
Island Uniform Aeronautical Regulatory Act, R.I. GEN. LAws tit. I, § 1-4-13 (1956) :
"Reports of hearings and investigations as evidence-Testimony by director and ad-
ministrator. The reports of investigations or hearings, or any part thereof, shall not
be admitted in evidence or used for any purpose in any suit, action, or proceeding
growing out of any matter referred to in such investigations or hearings, or in any
report thereof, except in case of criminal or other proceedings instituted by or in behalf
of the director under the provision of this chapter; nor shall either the director or the
administrator of aeronautics be required to testify to any facts ascertained in, or
information gained by reason of his official capacity." The Wisconsin Savings and
Loan Association Law, Wis. STAT. ANN. §215.50(6) (1957), provides: "Disclosure
of information; . . . (a) The commissioner, and all other officers and employees of
the savings and loan department, and members of the advisory committee shall keep
secret all of the facts and information obtained in the course of examination . . .
except when called as a witness in any criminal proceeding or trial in a court of
justice . .. ."
89. See N.Y. LA. LANw §753(3). "Members of the board [State Board of
Mediation], the executive secretary and all other employees of the board shall not
be compelled to disclose to any administrative or judicial tribunal any information
relating to, or acquired in, the course of their official activities" in the mediation and
negotiation of disputes between employers and employees.
90. See Ehrhardt v. Ruan Transp. Corp., 245 Iowa 193, 61 N.W.2d 696 (1953);
Rockwood v. Pierce, 235 Minn. 519, 51 N.W.2d 670 (1952) (the court reviews statutes
from several jurisdictions).
91. The N.Y. State Sanitary Code ch. 2, reg. 26 (PUB. HEALTH LAW) provides
that records of the state or local departments of health relating to cases of cancroid,
1958]
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adoption and illegitimate births. 2 In addition, disclosure is prohibited
of welfare relief records," social security and unemployment insurance
reports,9 4 records of claims for veterans' benefits " and census in-
formation.'
Since the statutes restricting disclosure may cut down the evidence
available in a judicial proceeding the courts have generally construed
them narrowly and in the light of the underlying reasons for their
enactment. If it appears that the basis for the privilege is not present
then the courts have refused to recognize the claims of privilege.
Several cases illustrate this.
In State ex rel. Haugland v. Smythe 7 a judge before whom was
pending a juvenile delinquency proceeding, issued a subpoena duces
tecum to a county welfare administratrix requiring her to produce for
his inspection certain files pertaining to the mother and grandparents
of the delinquent boy. Both federal and state statutes restricted the
disclosure of this information, and departmental regulations prohibited
their production in response to a subpoena duces tecum. Nevertheless,
the highest court of the state upheld the issuance of a subpoena on the
gonorrhea or syphilis "shall be confidential" and shall not be disclosed "except insofar
as is necessary to serve the best interest of the patient or his family, or contribute to
the protection of the public health." See Thomas v. Morris, 286 N.Y. 266, 36 N.E.2d
141 (1941) (records relating to a "typhoid carrier," whose disclosure is restricted
by the Public Health Law and Security Code, made available to plaintiff in action
for negligence against the defendant typhoid carrier).
92. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 114. "The written report of the investigation together
with all other papers pertaining to the adoption . . . must be sealed by him [judge
or surrogate] and withheld from inspection. . . . No order for access and inspection
shall be granted except on due notice to the foster parents and on good cause shown."
The UN Rom VrrAL STATISTICs Acr § 23 provides: "Disclosure of Records . . .
(2) Disclosure of illegitimacy of birth or of information from which it can be ascer-
tained, may be made only upon order of a court in a case where such information is
necessary for the determination of personal or property rights and then only for such
purpose."
93. See State ex rel. Haugland v. Smythe, 25 Wash. 2d 161, 169 P.2d 706 (1946).
94. See Marceau v. Orange Realty, Inc., 97 N.H. 497, 92 A.2d 656 (1952);
Powers ex rel Dep't of Employment Security v. Superior Court, 79 R.I. 63, 82 A.2d
885 (1951). See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 537, which prohibits use of information obtained
from employers and employees pursuant to the unemployment insurance law "in any
court . . . unless the commissioner is a party...."
95. See Veterans' Benefits Act of 1957, 71 Stat. 83, 38 U.S.C. § 3201 (Supp. V,
1958): "Sec. 1201. Confidential Nature of Claims. All files, records, reports and
other papers and documents pertaining to any claim under any of the laws administered
by the Veterans' Administration shall be confidential and privileged, and no disclosure
thereof shall be made except as follows . . . (2) when required by process of a
United States court to be produced in any suit or proceeding therein pending. ... "
96. See 13 U.S.C. § 8 (Supp. V, 1958). "The Secretary may, upon a written
request, and in his discretion, furnish . . . courts of record . . . data for genealogi-
cal purposes. . . . (c) In no case shall information furnished under the authority
of this section be used to the detriment of the persons to whom such information
relates."
97. 25 Wash. 2d 161, 169 P.2d 706 (1946).
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ground that "the information sought by the Juvenile Court was for its
own use. . . ." Such a disclosure, the court felt, was not an invasion
of the privilege.
The same court went even further in another case in narrowing the
application of the statutory privilege when, in a criminal prosecution for
rape, it required the production of the files of the County Welfare
Department pertaining to the prosecuting witness, not only for the
examination of the court, but also in the judge's chambers by the
attorneys for the prosecution and the defense. The court felt that
constitutional due process so required."
In contrast to this we find that the highest court of New York,
in a civil case, held that a statute providing for nondisclosure of medical
reports containing the causes of death will support a claim of privilege
to withhold such a report, which is sought in a pending workmen's
compensation action in which the cause of death was a material and
pertinent fact. 9
The most frequent litigation arising out of statutory privileges
involves accident reports. Most states provide that such reports when
made by a police investigation are confidential and unavailable in
litigation. However, the question often arises whether the police officer
making the investigation can be required to testify as to admissions
made by one of the parties, not from his report, but from his own
knowledge. The subject was examined fully by the Minnesota Supreme
Court in Rockwood v. Pierce,1 ° which held that such testimony was not
so privileged.'
Finally, in view of the nature of the privilege, it is generally held
that the person who furnished the information may, by his own act,
waive the privilege applicable to that information, and obtain it for
his own use.'
THE FUNCTION OF THE COURT IN DETERMINING APPLICABILITY
OF PRIVILEGE
Probably the most discussed, and still unresolved, problem of an
agency's claim of privilege concerns the respective responsibilities of
the agency and the court in deciding whether the privilege is properly
claimed. There is considerable difference of opinion as to where the
98. State ex rel. State v. Church, 35 Wash. 2d 170, 211 P2d 701 (1949).
99. In re Bakers Mut. Ins. Co., 301 N.Y. 21, 92 N.E.2d 49 (1950).
100. 235 Minn. 519, 51 N.W.2d 670 (1952).
101. Accord, Wallace v. Skrzycld, 333 Mich. 164, 61 N.W.2d 106 (1953) ; Uni-
versal Airlines, Inc. v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 188 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1951). But see
Ehrhardt v. Ruan Transp. Corp., 245 Iowa 193, 61 N.W.2d 696 (1953).
102. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Lykins, 216 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1954); Bowles v.
Ackerman, 4 F.R.D. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); Powers ex rel. Dep't of Employment
Security v. Superior Court, 79 R.I. 63, 82 A2d 885 (1951).
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final authority is lodged, and a variety of procedural devices have
been proposed to minimize the clash of interest between the courts and
the agencies on this issue.
The primary question is whether an agency's claim of privilege
precludes any judicial inquiry into the merits of the claim. The
English rule is that it does, at least in civil cases. There, if the claim
is made in proper form by the highest departmental officer on the
ground that it would be contrary to the public interest to disclose the
information, the courts have no alternative but to deny an application
for its production.' In the United States, however, the courts are
unwilling to accord a similar "prerogative immunity" to agency claims.
To this there is at least one recognized qualification. In the case of
the President of the United States or the governor of a state, an
assertion of "executive privilege" to withhold information on the general
ground that it would be contrary to the public interest to disclose it,
would most likely be upheld without the necessity of submission to
the courts.""4
Although several judicial opinions and writers have stated that
lesser officials have a similar right,'05 the Supreme Court has indicated
that the question of privilege, when claimed by officials other than the
President, is one for the courts to decide. In United States v.
Reynolds,"6 Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, for the majority of the Court,
said: "The court itself must determine whether the circumstances are
103. Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624. The rule in this case
is criticized in ALLEN, LAw AND ORDEms 369 (1956); and Street, State Secrets-A
Comparative Study, 14 MoDERN L. REV 121 (1951). The Canadian courts are said
to have departed from the English rule. Willis, 33 CAN. B. Rxv. 352 (1955), com-
menting on Regina v. Snider, [1954] Can. Sup. Ct. 479, [1954] 4 D.L.R. 483.
104. See note 19 supra. "The assertion of such a privilege by the Executive,
vis-i-vis Congress, is a judicially undecided issue," said Mr. Justice Reed, sitting by
assignment in the Court of Claims. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United
States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 944 n.7 (Ct. Cl. 1958). See also Bishop, The Executive's
Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitution ul Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477 (1957).
105. In Dayton v. Dulles, 254 F.2d 71, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd on other grounds,
357 U.S. 144 (1958), Judge Prettyman said that, where disclosure would adversely
affect our internal security for the conduct of foreign affairs, "[T]he cases and common
sense hold that the court cannot compel the Secretary [of State] to disclose infor-
mation garnered by him in confidence in this area. If he need not disclose the
information he has, the only other course is for the courts to accept his assertion that
disclosure would be detrimental in the fields of highest importance entrusted to his
exclusive care. We think we must follow that course." See also Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953), where the Court held that in
an exclusion case the authority of the Attorney General is "final and conclusive" and
that he "cannot be compelled to disclose the evidence underlying his determinations
in an exclusion case. . . ." See also Timbers & Cohen, Demands of Litigants for
Government Infornatim, 18 U. Pirr. L. Ray. 687, 709-15 (1957); Haydock, Some
Evidentiary Problems Posed by Atomic Energy Security Requirements, 61 HARv. L.
Ray. 468, 472-75 (1948).
106. 345 U.S. 1 (1953). In the lower court opinion in this case, on which the
dissenting Justices Black, Frankfurter and Jackson based their dissent, Judge Maris
stated: "[W] e are satisfied that a claim of privilege against disclosing evidence relevant
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appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a
disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect." 107
The case, however, was not decided on that issue.' 08 The Court held
that where a claim of privilege indicated a "reasonable possibility" that
privileged information is involved, the party seeking the information
must show "necessity" for compelling production. Such necessity was
not present in this case, said the majority, because the plaintiffs had not
availed themselves of an offer by the Government to examine the wit-
nesses whose statements were among the documents sought to be
produced.' 9
to the issues in a pending law suit involves a justiciable question, traditionally within
the competence of the courts, which is to be determined in accordance with the
appropriate rules of evidence, upon the submission of the documents in question to
the judge for his examination in canera. Such examination must obviously be ex
parte and in canera if the privilege is not to be lost in its assertion. But to hold that
the head of an executive department of the Government in a suit to which the United
States is a party may conclusively determine the Government's claim of privilege is
to abdicate the judicial function and permit the executive branch of the government
to infringe the independent province of the judiciary as laid down by the Constitution."
Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 997 (3d Cir. 1951). See also McCoaMIcx,
EVIDENCE 307 (1954) : "The determination of questions of fact and the applications
of legal standards thereto in passing upon the admissibility of evidence and the
validity of claims of evidential privilege are traditionally the responsibility of the
judge." See Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 391 (1953).
107. 345 U.S. at 8.
108. 345 U.S. at 11. This was a death action under the Federal Tort Claims
Act ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.),
brought by survivors of civilian observers who were killed in a crash of a mili-
tary aircraft testing secret equipment. The plaintiffs moved, under rule 34 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for production of the Air Force's official
accident investigations report and the statements of the three surviving crew members,
taken in connection with the official investigations. The Government asserted that
the requested information was privileged, and in the affidavit accompanying the formal
claim of privilege offered to produce the three surviving crew members for examination
by the plaintiffs. The district court, however, ordered the Government to produce
the documents in order that the court might determine whether they contained privi-
leged matter. The Government refused, so the court entered an order, under rule
37(b) (2) (i), that the facts on the issue of negligence would be taken as established
in plaintiffs favor, and, after a hearing to determine damages, final judgment was
entered for the plaintiffs. The court of appeals affirmed. But the Supreme Court
reversed on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to show "necessity" for the produc-
tion of the documents, since they did not accept the offer of the Government to
examine the three surviving crew members "which might have given respondents the
evidence to make out their case without forcing a showdown on the claim of privilege."
See also Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct.
Cl. 1958).
109. It may be significant that the Reynolds case involved a discovery proceeding
under rule 34, which conditions relief on a showing of "good cause." The "necessity"
rule applied by the majority appears to be a judicial extension of that condition,
where a claim of privilege is made. Said the Court, "[Ilt was entirely proper to rule
initially that petitioner had shown probable cause for discovery of the documents.
Thereafter, when the formal claim of privilege was flied by the Secretary of the Air
Force, under circumstances indicating a reasonable possibility that military secrets
were involved, there was certainly a sufficient showing of privilege to cut off further
demand for the documents on the showing of necessity for its compulsion that had
then been made." 345 U.S. at 10-11. However, the "good cause" condition (and its
judicial extension?) does not apply under rule 45, where production of documents
are demanded by subpoena for use at trial. It might be noted that a similar showing
of "necessity" was found lacking in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), a land-
mark case in federal discovery proceedings.
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In a sequel to the Reynolds case, arising in the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, the parties did avail themselves of a similar
opportunity to examine witnesses whose statements to the Government
were sought in a discovery proceeding but, upon the refusal of several of
them to testify, the court ordered production, and held that no evi-
dentiary privileges were available for the type of information withheld.
Upon the refusal of the Government to comply with the order to pro-
duce, the Government's action was dismissed.1
On the issue of whether the courts rather than the agencies should
decide the availability of privilege, it is argued that the courts may not
be expert enough to make a proper determination, particularly where
highly technical data is involved; ... that the administrative officials
can be trusted not to withhold information irresponsibly; 12 and that
disclosure to the court creates unwarranted risks where top secret in-
formation is involved." s
In reply it is maintained that judges are capable of dealing with
technical data, for they are regularly confronted with all kinds; 114
that agencies are likely to be overcautious and thus withhold too much
information; 115 and that the caliber of men who are judges minimizes
any risk of unwarranted disclosure." While none of these arguments
110. Mitchell v. Bass, 252 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1958). This was an action insti-
tuted by the Secretary of Labor to enjoin violations of minimum wage, overtime,
and record-keeping provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The defendants
moved, under rule 34, for the production of statements made by eleven of defendant's
employees to the Secretary's investigators. The motion was denied on the ground
that good cause had not been shown, as required by rule 34, since the defendant knew
the names and could get statements from the witnesses. Thereupon the defendant
tried to obtain the statements, but four of the witnesses refused. He then renewed
the motion to produce the statements of these four witnesses, but the Secretary claimed
they were privileged. The court overruled the claim of privilege, finding that neither
the informer privilege nor an "executive" privilege applied, and ordered production of
the statements. Upon the Secretary's refusal to produce, the action was dismissed
pursuant to rule 37(b) (2) (iii).
111. See Haydock, Some Evi4dentiary Problens Posed by Atomic Energy Security
Requirements, 61 HAxv. L. REv. 468, 475 (1948).
112. See Timbers & Cohen, Denrands of Litigants for Governmenf Information,
18 U. Prrr. L. REv. 687, 708-09: "Government officials should not be, and rarely are,
insensitive to the public interest in the rendition of justice in a courtroom. Where
there is a real need for the information sought-because it is essential to the proper
determination of the case and appears to be unavailable elsewhere-they should and
generally do cooperate to the fullest possible extent consistent with the preservation
of the integrity of investigative and law enforcement processes, for the protection of
other public interests." But see ALmq, LAw AND ORDERs 371 (1956), wherein he
discussed "the usual assurances . . . given that Ministers and departments could be
trusted to use the privilege with fairness and discretion." In answer to this he said:
"It never seems to be realised when this soothing-syrup is administered that 'abuse
of power' does not consist only in gross, unscrupulous excess of it, but also in gradual
and often well-meaning extension, in a timorous rather than an aggressive spirit."
113. Haydock, supra note 111, at 475.
114. McCoRmaicK, EviDENcE 307 (1954).
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid.
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is entirely persuasive, the scales, it seems to the author, are tipped in
favor of having the courts make the ultimate determination since (1)
they can appraise the claim of privilege with relative objectivity as
compared with any agency evaluation, and (2) the manner in which
the discretion can be exercised can minimize, to a great extent, any
added risk of disclosure.
Accepting the principle that the courts have the final say as to
whether particular information is privileged, several procedural devices
have been applied or proposed to limit disclosure of allegedly con-
fidential or secret information. Thus, the information can be examined
ex parte and in camera."7 To the argument that this is not due process,
it is maintained that it is at least better than no judicial examination at
all." 8 In some instances it is urged that in camera examination should
be conducted in the presence of counsel." 9 In addition, there are
precedents for conducting a trial in the presence of all parties, with the
public excluded. 20
It camera proceedings in criminal trials were specifically dis-
approved by the Supreme Court in the Jencks case. 2 ' This was
probably done in recognition of the provision of the sixth amendment
requiring a "public trial" in "all criminal prosecutions." If the due
process clauses do not require such a public trial in civil cases, and some
form of in camera proceedings are utilized to determine whether certain
information is of a privileged type, a minimum requirement should be
the presence of opposing counsel. Less than that, such as ex parte
determination by the court and government counsel, could not be
reconciled with our standards of fair procedure. If, under these
circumstances, the government finds it still cannot risk such limited
disclosure, the standards should not be further compromised, but the
court should, as in the Jencks case, rule against the government on the
issues raised." In weighing the rights of disclosure, even in appro-
priate in camera proceedings, the agency, of course, must consider a
possible appeal from a ruling in its favor. In such a case, the opposing
117. See Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1949). See also
the opinion of Judge Maris in Reynolds v. United States, quoted supra note 106.
118. Haydock, supra note 111, at 474.
119. See United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Comm., 9 F.R.D. 719 (W.D.
La.), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 339 U.S. 940 (1949). See also State ex rel.
State v. Church, 35 Wash. 2d 170, 211 P2d 701 (1949).
120. See Haydock, supra note 111, at 482.
121. "The practice of producing government documents to the trial judge for his
determination of relevancy and materiality, without hearing the accused, is disapproved."
353 U.S. 657, 669 (1957). But see § 3500(c) of the post-Jencks statute: 18 U.S.C.
§3500(c) (Supp. V, 1958).
122. See United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Comm., 9 F.R.D. 719 (W.D.
La.), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 339 U.S. 940 (1949).
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party undoubtedly has the right of appeal, but disclosure could be
limited by effecting such appeal on sealed papers.'
CONCLUSION
Although the question here dealt with is a rather narrow one, it
touches upon fundamental principles of due process. Some recent
decisions reflect a disturbing willingness to whittle down, on the ground
that inferior interests are at stake, recognized procedural safeguards in
adjudicative proceedings before governmental agencies that are charged
with the task of seeing that justice is done. No guides appear in the
decisions indicating where an interest acquires a procedurally protected
status. On the contrary, in the Greene case, now pending before the
Supreme Court (in which the court of appeals held that, on the
basis of undisclosed information, a governmental order may require the
discharge of an individual employed by a private company holding a
Defense Department contract), the door has been opened to unchecked
administrative intervention in the employment status of persons em-
ployed in at least 20,000 plants that have military contracts."2 The
court there simply said that what is good for public employment is good
for private employment. This kind of loose analogy has obvious
dangers, especially where the example itself has shaky foundations.
One infers from these cases that there is, or should be, a hierarchy
of interests to which different degrees of a right to procedural due
process can be attached. But this is retrogressive. It has been shown
in other areas that judicial gradations assigning one degree of legal
protection to so-called "privileges", "benefits" or "gratuities" and
another to "rights," led to inconsistent and unfair results which legis-
lation must correct.' Similarly, by creating overly-refined distinc-
tions among various "rights" or "interests" deep inroads are made
into fundamental procedural principles.
If "reasonable" limitations are appropriate where procedural due
process is concerned, there is a sounder basis on which they can be
applied. This can be, and has been, accomplished by defining, on the
basis of an adjustment of the interrelated interests, the kinds of infor-
mation that are presumptively privileged. The presumption, when
123. See Appeal of SEC, 226 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1955).
124. Greene v. McElroy, 254 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 27 U.S.L.
WEEK 3134 (U.S. Oct. 27, 1958) (No. 180).
125. See H.R. 272, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), which is a bill providing for the
judicial review of determinations of the Administrator of Veterans Affairs. At the
present time such determinations are non-reviewable mainly on the theory that they
deal with "benefits" or "gratuities." See CoMI rlSSlON ON ORGANIZATION OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GoVERNMENT, TASK FoRCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND
PRocE~uR 208 (1955).
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formally claimed, sets in motion procedural machinery whereby the
ultimate decision on the right to withhold information is in the hands
of the court. At the same time, protection against undue disclosure of
the information is provided by the limited exposure of in camera
proceedings. This, of course, is the import of our discussion.
This Article has also reviewed the rationale underlying the types
of information presumptively privileged at common law, and elaborated
on them to some extent on the basis of recent experience. If this
classification is valid, it may be desirable to incorporate it in legislation,
and also to eliminate such existing provisions as might cause confusion.
Thus, there would be no need to retain the present provisions of
the Federal Administrative Procedure Act which state that information
may be withheld concerning "any function of the United States re-
quiring secrecy in the public interest," "6 or "required for good cause
to be held confidential." '2 The proposed "Code of Federal Adminis-
trative Procedure" of the ABA, presently under discussion as a replace-
ment for the Administrative Procedure Act, recognizes this. It names
four categories of subject matter which an agency will not be required
to disclose: "subject matter which is (1) specifically exempt from
publication by statute, (2) required to be kept secret in the protection of
national security, (3) submitted in confidence pursuant to statute or
agency rule or direction, or (4) the disclosure of which would be a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."
Although this is a decided improvement over the Administrative
Procedure Act, it falls somewhat short of the standards which the
analysis here advanced discloses. Item (3) of the proposal, informa-
tion "submitted in confidence pursuant to statute or agency rule or
direction," is too vague. Almost any information submitted to an
agency can be brought within its terms. This provision should be
deleted and a category of "communications relating to internal manage-
ment" be added. Furthermore, the bill fails to provide for information
relating to international relations, generally recognized under the com-
mon law "secrets of state" privilege, and the informer privilege. In
addition, since the Federal "Housekeeping" Act has been amended to
preclude its use as a basis for regulations dealing with the nondisclosure
of information by subordinate officials," s another provision should be
added to such a bill, authorizing the issuance of regulations governing
disclosure of information by subordinate agency officials. This would
preserve the rule of the Boske and Touhy cases." 9
126. 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1952).
127. 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (b) (1952).
128. See notes 23, 24 supra.
129. See notes 21, 22 supra.
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Finally, we might note that the full implications of the Jencks and
Reynolds cases still remain to be developed. Does Jencks stand for the
proposition that no privilege will be recognized in a criminal prosecu-
tion? If not, which of the privileged types of information will be
recognized? It will be recalled that Mr. Justice Brennan indicated that
in civil causes "the protection of vital national interests [secrets of
state?] may militate against public disclosure of documents in the
Government's possession." And, he went on to say, quoting from
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson's opinion in the Reynolds case, that in
criminal causes
"the Government can invoke its evidentiary privileges only at
the price of letting the defendant go free. The rationale of the
criminal cases is that, since the Government which prosecutes an
accused also has the duty to see that justice is done, it is uncon-
scionable to allow it to undertake prosecution and then invoke its
governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which
might be material to his defense .... " "
Does this apply to information admittedly "secrets of state"? To the
names of informers?
In Reynolds, where it is assumed that the full panoply of privileged
types of information would apply in civil cases, the Court did not reach
the issue of privilege, or the manner in which it is to be determined. It
interpolated a requirement of a showing of "necessity" when the
government claimed privilege and there was a "reasonable possibility"
that it would be upheld. Since the case concerned a discovery proceed-
ing under rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a require-
ment of a showing of necessity would be technically justified if it could
be equated with the showing of "good cause" which rule 34 requires as
a basis for the issuance by the court of an order to compel production
of requested documents. If this is so, the showing of "necessity" would
not be required where the information is sought for use at trial pursuant
to subpoena under rule 45, since the latter rule does not provide for a
showing of good cause.
Where these technical hurdles are surmounted, it appears, as in-
dicated in the recent case of Mitchell v. Bass,' that the federal courts
will insist that they have the final say as to whether particular matters
are privileged, and further thought must now be given to the mechanics
of preventing unnecessary disclosure of allegedly privileged information
in the process of such determination.
130. 345 U.S. at 12.
131. 252 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1958).
